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Objective. This article examines how epidemiological evidence is and should be used in the context of
increasing concern for health equity and for social determinants of health.
Method.A research literature on use of scientiﬁc evidence of “environmental risks” is outlined, and key issues
compared with those that arise with respect to social determinants of health.
Results. The issue sets are very similar. Both involve the choice of a standard of proof, and the corollary need to
make value judgments about how to address uncertainty in the context of “the inevitability of being wrong,” at
least some of the time, and to consider evidence frommultiple kinds of research design. The nature of such value
judgments and the need for methodological pluralism are incompletely understood.
Conclusion.Responsible policy analysis and interpretation of scientiﬁc evidence require explicit consideration
of the ethical issues involved in choosing a standard of proof. Because of the stakes involved, such choices often
become contested political terrain. Comparative research on how those choices are made will be valuable.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Prologue
Most readers of a certain age will be familiar with the murder of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, and the events that
followed. Ms Simpson's ex-husband, former professional athlete O.J.
Simpson, was acquitted of the murders in a controversial trial, but
later found liable for civil damages in a lawsuit brought by the family
of the victims. Although superﬁcially unrelated to epidemiology, this
case serves to illustrate the applicability of the legal concept of a stan-
dard of proof to the use of epidemiology in public policy. In common
law countries conviction in a criminal trial requires the prosecution to
meet a higher standard of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
than in a civil proceeding where a claim for damages can be sustained
on a preponderance of the evidence or on the balance of probabilities.
The difference reﬂects an underlying principle: it is ethically more
objectionable to reach a false positive conclusion (i.e. to convict an
innocent person) in a criminal trial than to award damages against a
non-blameworthy defendant in a civil action, because of the presump-
tion that the consequences of the former error are more onerous for
the individual affected. In practice, this may or may not be the case,
and holding prosecutors to a higher standard of proof in criminal
proceedings requires that defendants be represented by competent
counsel, but these caveats do not detract from the analytical point.
Science and values in environmental policy
The analogywith courtroom standards of proofwas used to powerful
effect in a 1978 article by economist Talbot Page about “environmental
risks” like toxic chemicals, which share such characteristics as incom-
plete knowledge of the mechanism of action, long latency periods be-
tween exposure and illness, and irreversibility of effect. He argued that,
like criminal proceedings (at least in their idealized form), many forms
of scientiﬁc inquiry that are relevant to regulating such risks are designed
around minimizing Type I errors— false positives or incorrect rejections
of the null hypothesis. This organizing principle is exempliﬁed by the
95% threshold (p ≤ 0.05) below which a ﬁnding is routinely considered
not to be statistically signiﬁcant. Page further argued that minimizing
Type I errors may be an inappropriate principle when transferred
unreﬂectively to public policy toward environmental risks (see also
Lemons et al., 1997). The possibility of widespread or irreversible dam-
age to public health means that consideration must also be given to the
consequences of a Type II error or false negative. “In its extreme,”
wrote Page, “the approach of limiting false positives requires positive
evidence of ‘dead bodies’ before acting” (Page, 1978: 237). This is not
rhetoric, but rather a precise and literal characterization of how US in-
dustries, in particular, resisted regulatory initiatives in the years before
and shortly after Page's article appeared (Jasanoff, 1982; Robinson and
Paxman, 1991). More recently, resistance in the US and elsewhere has
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shifted to an emphasis on scientiﬁc or science-based regulation — a
rhetoric that ignores the central points made by Page, and in this article.
Deferring action pending the availability of more evidence is, in
itself, a choice to value some kinds of consequences more highly than
others — a point that was made shortly after Page's article appeared
by a former senior US ofﬁcial, who noted “the inevitability of being
wrong,” at least some of the time, when science is used as the basis for
regulation (Jellinek, 1981). The following year Beverley Paigen, a cancer
researcher who became involved in a controversy over whether to relo-
cate households living on top of a disused industrial waste dump (the
Love Canal), described:
... a conversation [she] hadwith aHealth Department epidemiologist
concerning the data on adverse pregnancy outcomes at Love Canal.
We both agreed that we should take the conservative approach only
to ﬁnd that in every case we disagreed over what the conservative
approach was. To him ‘conservative’ meant that we must be very
cautious about concluding that Love Canal was an unsafe place to
live. The evidence had to be compelling because substantialﬁnancial
resources were needed to correct the problem. To me ‘conservative’
meant that wemust be very cautious about concluding that Love ca-
nal was a safe place to live. The evidence had to be compelling be-
cause the public health consequences of an error were
considerable. And sowe disagreed on speciﬁc detail after speciﬁc de-
tail.
This is not a scientiﬁc issue, nor can it be resolved by scientiﬁc
methods. The issue is ethical, for it is a value judgment to decide
whether to make errors on the side of protecting human health or
on the side of conserving state resources (Paigen, 1982: 32).
Jellinek's point that “postponing action… is a decision” in the same
way as taking regulatory action was reiterated by Grandjean (2004);
the larger issue of the need to set standards of proof based on explicit
normative consideration of the potential consequences of Type I and
Type II errors in policywas comprehensively revisited in the academic lit-
erature by Cranor (1993: 3–48) and subsequently by Shrader-Frechette
(1996: 20–23), Lemons et al. (1997) and Parascandola (2010), among
others.
Contrasting orientations characterize recent approaches to regulating
environmental and consumer product risks in the United States and the
European Union. In the latter, the precautionary principle is written into
a variety of legal instruments, often resulting in stricter regulatory stan-
dards (i.e., less emphasis on avoiding Type I errors) than in the United
States (Vogel, 2012). This has not always been the case, and critically,
neither approach is more scientiﬁc or ‘science-based’, and neither is ‘cor-
rect’. Rather, the approaches reﬂect application of different sets of values
to dealing with scientiﬁc uncertainty. This point remains inadequately
understood, as shown for example by Löfstedt's (2013) effort to contrast
“evidence based” regulation (based on quantitative risk assessment)
with what he sees as the “unscientiﬁc” application of the precautionary
principle.
Social determinants of health: looking “upstream”
Such lack of understanding arguably continues to compromise the
quality of public policy toward environmental risks such as hormonally
active agents or “endocrine disrupters” (Kortenkamp et al., 2012; van
Vliet and Jensen, 2012). Strong parallels exist with issues that arise in
the context of heightened concern for health equity – “the absence of
systematic disparities in health (or in the major social determinants of
health) between social groups who have different levels of underlying
social advantage/disadvantage – that is, different positions in a social
hierarchy” (Braveman and Gruskin, 2003: 254) — and the emerging
body of evidence on social determinants of health (Commission on
Social Determinants of Health, 2008). The pathways that lead from
conditions of life and work to health disparities, by way of multiple
exposures and vulnerabilities (Diderichsen et al., 2001), are if anything
more complex and less predictable than those involved with the opera-
tion of environmental risks. As in the case of environmental risks, both
researchers and those seeking to use their ﬁndings for policy and advo-
cacy must therefore make or understand multiple “methodological
value judgments” (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1993: 84–101).
These begin with the choice of outcomes for study. Over a time
frame that permits effective policy response or intervention design,
changes in mortality rates and causes of death may be too crude an in-
dicator of the consequences of social and economic inequalities except
in the case of catastrophic disruptions like the collapse of the former
Soviet economy and the parallel collapse of social supports and health
systems (Frank and Haw, 2011). In less extreme situations, changes in
mortality data or the prevalence of other adverse outcomes may,
given the accumulation of effects of disadvantage over the life course
(Blane, 2006), take decades to become evident. This effect has been
described as “epidemiological inertia” (Frank and Haw, 2011: 676)
and raises problems similar to those associatedwith the long latency as-
sociated with many health outcomes attributable to environmental
risks. Against this background of uncertainty, how long is too long to
wait to see whether “dead bodies” appear?
Assuming that the choice has beenmade not to wait for the epidemi-
ological Godot of data on mortality or other health outcomes, should
evidence of (for instance) changes in risk factors like obesity, which con-
tributes to a broad range of adverse health outcomes, or allostatic load,
which is a basic concept in the physiology of chronic stress (McEwen
and Gianaros, 2010; Seeman et al., 2010), be sufﬁcient to justify initiating
an intervention or to consider it successful? Or should the net be cast
wider still? Support for this latter position comes from an important liter-
ature review on overweight and obesity: “Many strategies aimed at obe-
sity prevention may not be expected to have a direct impact on BMI, but
rather onpathways thatwill alter the context inwhich eating, physical ac-
tivity and weight control occur. Any restriction on the concept of a suc-
cessful outcome, to either weight-maintenance or BMI measures alone,
is therefore likely to overlook many possible intervention measures that
could contribute to obesity prevention” (Mooney et al., 2011: 22). No al-
gorithm will provide a correct answer, and the choice of how much evi-
dence is enough should be addressed as an issue of public health ethics.
Use of the randomized controlled trial (RCT) as the gold standard for
intervention research, sitting atop a hierarchy of evidence, likewise in-
corporates a set ofmethodological value judgments thatmerit reconsid-
eration. Although examples exist of sound RCTs of large-scale policy
initiatives such as conditional cash transfers to low-income households
(Lagarde et al., 2007) and housing vouchers to enable the poor to move
to less distressed neighborhoods (Ludwig et al., 2011), many kinds of
interventions and policies cannot be assessed using RCTs, for reasons of
ethics, costs, logistics, or all of these. Even when an RCT is conceptually
possible, insisting on evidence from RCTs may build into intervention
research a bias against larger-scale, contextual interventions that are
difﬁcult to evaluate in this manner (Schrecker et al., 2001: 1679–1682;
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine 2013: 164, 262–
263). And the problem of fallacious inferences of lack of effect remains
(cf. Greenland, 2011). Again illustrating inadequate understanding of
the issues, the authors of a recent commentary on social epidemiology
implicitly concede many of the points made here, while nevertheless
urging researchers to focus on questions that can be addressed using
experimental or quasi-experimental methods, and “identifying causal
relationships that can be of the most use to policymakers,” without
addressing the values or politics driving policymakers' choices about
usefulness (Harper and Strumpf, 2012).
Science and contested political terrain
Such issues have historically been of far more than academic impor-
tance when the choice of a standard of proof becomes contested politi-
cal terrain. The economic payoffs from “manufacturing uncertainty”
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(Michaels, 2006; Michaels and Monforton, 2005) can be formidable
when proposals to regulate environmental, workplace or consumer
product risks are involved. The strategy of manufacturing uncertainty
was perfected by the tobacco industry starting in the 1950s, and has
since been pursued by various industries facing regulation of hazards
associated with their products or activities (Davis, 2007: 296–434;
Michaels, 2006); a recent journalistic exposé makes this point about
the sugar industry's response to escalating concern about rising preva-
lence of overweight and obesity (Taubes and Couzens, 2012). Indeed,
overweight and alcohol abuse have been categorized as “industrial epi-
demics” in which “the vectors of spread are not biological agents, but
transnational corporations” that “implement sophisticated campaigns
to undermine public health interventions” (Moodie et al., 2013: 671).
Critically, the success of industry protagonists depends on their ability
to frame the debate (incorrectly) as one about the strength of scientiﬁc
evidence, rather than about the values that should be brought to bear on
the treatment of scientiﬁc uncertainty and protection of public health.
As in the case of environmental risks, adopting what has been called
a tobacco industry standard of proof (Crocker, 1984: 66–67) with re-
spect to social determinants of health means the evidence may never
be strong enough. Michael Marmot, later to chair the Commission on
Social Determinants of Health, has warned that “the best should not
be the enemy of the good. While we should not formulate policies in
the absence of evidence to support them, we must not be paralyzed
into inaction while we wait for the evidence to be absolutely unim-
peachable” (Marmot, 2000: 308). Issues of scale, standards of proof
and hierarchies of evidence converge in cases where health effects of
past policies are being considered as a guide for future action, for exam-
ple when the potential health consequences of public sector austerity
programs are considered, as recommended by a recent review of health
equity in WHO's European Region (Marmot et al., 2012). It can be
argued that the austerity programs now being adopted in many juris-
dictions (although not all) constitute a large-scale social experiment
on non-consenting populations (Stuckler and Basu, 2013); whatever
the quality of the epidemiological evidence that emerges in a decade
or so, when enough data have been accumulated, some of us regard
the experiment as ethically problematic and irresponsible.
Obviously, what counts as strong evidence will depend on the ob-
jects of study; for understanding howmacro-scale social and economic
policies inﬂuencehealth bywayof its social determinants, anthropology
may be as relevant as epidemiology (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010). The
argument here is not for neglecting rigor, but rather for recognizing
that different research designs and disciplines have their own distinc-
tive standards (methodological pluralism), and that some important
and policy-relevant questions are answerable using some research de-
signs and disciplines but not others. Arguing (for example) that action
on social determinants of health should await evidence from experi-
mental or quasi-experimental studies must be understood as adopting
a tobacco industry standard of proof, and as a political and ethical choice
rather than a scientiﬁc one. As suggested by the example of overweight
and obesity, complex population health problems are best addressed
using a “portfolio of interventions” (Swinburn et al., 2005) informed
by various kinds of evidence, an approach now accepted both in health
policy and in development policy (Snilstveit, 2012; Snilstveit et al.,
2012). A promising research strategy organizes inquiry around con-
trasts between “epidemiological worlds”: this concept, introduced but
not adequately theorized by Rydin et al. (2012), accommodates the re-
ality that social disparities, like many environmental exposures, reﬂect
multiple dimensions of (dis)advantage, potentially cumulative in their
effect. Controlling for all but a single variable in the interests ofmethod-
ological elegance or greater precision about causation simply disregards
that reality.
The argument is also not for unreﬂective adoption of a precautionary
or risk-averse approach. Even in the context of environmental risks,
especially when resources are limited, what constitutes precaution or
risk-aversion is not always self-evident or uncontentious. Although
the extensive literature cannot be explored here, The Economist
observed 20 years ago that: “If a developing country has the choice
between (a) investing in scrubbers on power stations to prevent acid
rain and (b) building hospitals, it will build hospitals ﬁrst. And it will
make more sense to persuade local industry to dump its toxic waste
with reasonable safety than to persuade it to treat the stuff to
American levels” (Cairncross, 1992: 10). Beyond the environmental
risk frame of reference, the examples multiply. The critical point is
that intellectually responsible approaches to assessing evidence for
action on social determinants of health involve generic questions that
cannot be answered by epidemiology, or by any science qua science:
What kinds of hazards or harms are most important to guard against?
And what are the appropriate standards of proof? This article is
intended to stimulate both debate on these points in the context of
social determinants of health and interest in comparative research on
how those questions are answered in policy and law.
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